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ALD-312        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2029 
___________ 
 
JAY BONANZA BRILEY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FORT DIX FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-16-cv-05571) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 20, 2017 
 
Before:   MCKEE, JORDAN and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 15, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jay Bonanza Briley, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix,  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  
We will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 In 2013, following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, Briley was convicted of three counts of assaulting, obstructing, and 
impeding a federal officer; and one count of disorderly conduct – obscene acts.  Briley 
was sentenced to a seventy-eight month period of incarceration, followed by three years 
of supervised release.   
 In September 2014, while incarcerated at FCI Loretto, Briley filed a habeas 
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) improperly applied a Greater Security Management 
Variable (“MGTV”) to his security classification, and seeking an order that would allow 
him to serve his sentence on home confinement or at a federal prison camp.  The District 
Court dismissed Briley’s § 2241 petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Briley 
appealed and, on January 14, 2016, this Court affirmed the District Court’s decision, 
holding that “Briley’s challenge to his custody classification is not cognizable in a § 2241 
petition because he does not challenge the basic fact or duration of his imprisonment.”  
Briley v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 632 F. App’x 84, 84 (3d Cir. 2016).  Briley subsequently filed 
a number of unsuccessful post-conviction motions.   
 In September 2016, Briley filed the instant § 2241 petition, alleging that the BOP 
staff at FCI Fort Dix improperly renewed a MGTV and later improperly applied a Public 
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Safety Factor (“PSF”) to his security classification, precluding him from transferring to a 
minimum-security prison camp.  Briley seeks immediate release to a residential reentry 
center (“RRC”), and participation in the Veteran Outreach Treatment Program and the 
Veterans Reentry Program.1  He further requests one year’s early release based on his 
Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) treatment.2   
 By order entered on April 21, 2017, the District Court dismissed Briley’s § 2241 
motion because the claims challenging the BOP’s renewal of a MGTV and assignment of 
a PSF were not cognizable under federal habeas review, and the claims for RRC 
placement and early release for RDAP treatment were unexhausted.  Briley appeals. 
 
II. 
                                              
1 Briley named as defendants: Attorney General Loretta Lynch, FCI Fort Dix Warden 
Ortiz, and FCI Fort Dix Unit Managers Robinson and Olsen.  The District Court properly 
dismissed from the action all defendants with the exception of Warden Ortiz because the 
proper respondent to a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the petitioner’s immediate 
custodian.  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35 (2004). 
 
2 Briley also sought money damages based on his deprivation of transfer to a camp.  By 
order entered on September 23, 2016, the District Court determined that Briley’s § 2241 
petition could proceed, but that he must file a separate civil rights action, after exhausting 
his administrative remedies, to seek money damages for a constitutional violation.  Briley 
also submitted an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, asking that he 
be brought before the District Court to present his case.  The District Court denied 
Briley’s application because an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary as his petition did 
not turn on disputed factual issues.  See, e.g., Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 
700, 719 n.16 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding “where the motion turns on a disputed factual 
issue, an evidentiary hearing is ordinarily required”). 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 
F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).  Because Briley has been granted in forma 
pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this appeal for possible dismissal 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We may summarily affirm under Third Circuit 
LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 if the appeal lacks substantial merit.   
 We agree with the District Court that, like the claims in his previous § 2241 
petition, Briley’s instant claims – that the BOP staff improperly renewed a MGTV and 
improperly applied a PSF to his security classification – are not cognizable in a § 2241 
petition because he does not challenge the basic fact or duration of his imprisonment.  
See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).  Nor does Briley’s claim challenge 
the “execution” of his sentence within the narrow scope described in Woodall v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005).  In Woodall, we held that a district 
court has jurisdiction under § 2241 to consider a federal prisoner’s challenge to the 
failure to transfer him to a community corrections center (“CCC”) because “[c]arrying 
out a sentence through detention in a CCC is very different than carrying out a sentence 
in an ordinary penal institution.”  Id. at 243.  Specifically, we determined that Woodall 
sought “more than a simple transfer,” observing that his claims “crossed[ed] the line 
beyond a challenge to, for example, a garden variety prison transfer.”  Id.  Briley’s claim 
that he was denied transfer to a minimum-security prison camp is much more akin to the 
“garden variety” transfers that are excluded from the scope of § 2241. 
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 Briley also seeks immediate RRC placement, participation in the Veteran 
Outreach Treatment Program and Veterans Reentry Program, and one year’s early release 
based on RDAP treatment.  While this Court has allowed a habeas petitioner to challenge 
a BOP decision denying transfer to a half-way house or RRC, see Woodall, 432 F.3d at 
243-44, Briley has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for these claims, 
see Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 760-62 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding 
federal inmate must first exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241).  Briley concedes that he failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies, and seeks an abeyance of the petition.  We agree with the District Court that an 
abeyance is inappropriate here as it frustrates the purpose of “conserv[ing] judicial 
resources” when an agency may grant the relief sought through the administrative 
process.  Id. at 761-62.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there is no substantial question 
presented by this appeal, and will thus summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court. 
